



In 2005 the world economy still developed strongly, but,
with GDP growth of 41/2 percent, at a somewhat slower
pace than in 2004. Developments still differed substan-
tially among major regions. Whereas output continued to
increase in a robust and strong manner in the US and it
showed a clear upward, but still somewhat volatile trend in
Japan, European real GDP grew only at a moderate pace. 
This year the world economy is expected to grow at an
almost unchanged pace of around 41/2 percent, but this
time with a somewhat more even distribution across the
major regions. In the US, the expansion of real GDP is
expected to slow down somewhat, not least due to a less
accommodative monetary policy. Japan is likely to con-
tinue its recovery, but the Chinese economy remains the
engine of economic growth in Asia, although the fast
pace of expansion is expected to weaken slightly. The
pace of expansion in the European economy will in-
crease somewhat. In the euro area, real GDP growth is,
with a rate of 2.0 percent, forecasted to exceed poten-
tial growth somewhat. Economic activity in Europe will
be supported by strong, but in the course of this year
moderating, export growth. Domestic demand will
accelerate gradually, offsetting
the slowdown in external demand. 
The chapter points to the risk of
an undesirable mix between mone-
tary and fiscal policies in the euro
area: the ECB is likely to tighten
monetary policy in response to the
cyclical upswing, whereas the
stance of fiscal policy will proba-
bly remain more or less un-
changed. Instead, for reasons of
long-run sustainability structural
budget deficits in the euro area
should be reduced. 
1. The current situation
1.1 The European economy in 2005
In the European Union the slow business cycle recov-
ery, which started during the second half of 2003
already after one year made way for another phase of
weak growth (see Figure 1.1). In the euro area, the
annualised quarter-to-quarter GDP growth rates
from the third quarter of 2004 until the first quarter
of 2005 did not exceed 1.5 percent, whereas the aver-
age was 2.5 percent in the four preceding quarters.
During the course of 2005, the recovery in the
European economy gained pace again. Annualised
quarter-to-quarter growth reached 2.6 percent in the
third quarter, thereby allowing annual real GDP
growth to reach 1.4 percent. 
The initial weakening of especially domestic demand
in 2005 was mainly caused by feeble growth of private
consumption (see Figure 1.2). Since 2001, Germany is
characterised by severe restraint in consumption due
to unfavourable income developments and (political)
uncertainty. In the UK, private consumption hardly
grew in 2005. The previously supporting increases in
house prices subsided; the situation in the real estate
market calmed down substantially. Out of the group
of larger EU countries, only Spain experienced




* The forecast is based on data available
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this was to a large extent support-
ed by a continued real estate
boom, there appear to be consid-
erable downside risks there.
In contrast to moderately grow-
ing consumption demand, equip-
ment investment in Europe con-
tinued its upward trend. Slower
export growth and the renewed
deterioration of capacity utilisa-
tion in manufacturing restrained
the willingness to invest in the
beginning of last year. During
the second half of 2005 invest-
ment grew strongly, but without
reaching two-digit growth levels.
Not only domestic, but also for-
eign demand showed a weak
development during the first half
of last year. Exports only grew at
a moderate pace in the second
half of 2004 and even fell some-
what during the first quarter of
last year. Yet, they subsequently
recovered and were a driving
force behind the higher growth in
the second half of 2005.
Throughout most of last year, the
ECB kept its main refinancing
rate at 2.0 percent, implying real
interest rates close to zero (see
Figure 1.3). Only in December
did the bank increase its main
interest rates by 25 basis points.
The clear appreciation of the real
effective exchange rate of the
euro by 12 and 4 percent in 2003
and 2004, respectively, was to a
certain extent corrected last year,
leading to overall looser mone-
tary conditions in the euro area.
Economic developments in indi-
vidual countries remained rather
diverse. Whereas Spain again
experienced high real GDP
growth,  Italy barely recovered
from a recession. Also in Germa-
ny and in the Netherlands, eco-
nomic growth was low during
2005. The driving forces behind
Figure 1.2
Figure 1.3business cycle developments in
Europe differed substantially.
Overall, countries with stronger
growth have seen higher increas-
es in domestic demand, which
has been stimulated by either
increased labour income or rising
real estate prices. 
In Germany and Austria, foreign
demand was the main supporting
factor. Whereas the contribution
of the net foreign balance to eco-
nomic growth gained in signifi-
cance here, its importance
decreased in most other countries
within the euro area. The latter
can be explained by the un-
favourable composition of the export basket and a
reduction in price competitiveness against, in particu-
lar, the Asian economies. The differing export dynam-
ics are also reflected in the differing developments of
industrial production, which in both Germany and
Austria was stronger than in the rest of the euro area.
Against the background of moderate economic
growth, employment initially increased only slightly.
This is explained primarily by developments in Spain
and – despite the weak business cycle – in Italy. The
euro area unemployment rate, which slowly started
decreasing again in the autumn of 2004, equalled
8.6 percent in June 2005, as compared to 8.8 percent
at the end of 2004. Employment growth, however,
accelerated somewhat in the second half of 2005,
helping to reduce the unemployment rate to 8.3 per-
cent towards the end of the year.
Overall there were no clear inflationary tensions in
markets for labour and for goods and services.
Together with so-called base effects with respect to
specific administrated prices, this explains why in the
euro area core inflation, as measured by the HICP
excluding energy and unprocessed food, actually fell
somewhat from 2.1 percent in December 2004 to
1.4 percent in December last year (see Figure 1.4).
Mainly due to increases in oil prices, headline infla-
tion is expected to end up at 2.2 percent in 2005 (as
compared to 2.1 percent in 2004).
As in the previous years, and despite rising energy
prices, overall wages increased moderately. However,
substantial differences emerged on a country level.
Whereas average wages in Germany remained more or
less unchanged and wage increases in Italy were kept
below the euro area average, the rate of wage increase
was as high as 3 percent in Spain and in France (see
Table 1.1). 
In the majority of the new EU member countries
annual economic growth was lower in 2005 than in the
previous year. Real GDP increased by 4.2 percent on
average. This reduction from an average growth rate
of 5.1 percent in 2004 is mainly attributable to Po-
land, where especially private consumption grew only
moderately. With the exception of Hungary and the
Slovak Republic, investment levelled off. Lower do-
mestic demand increases had its impact on import
growth. Output growth was also dampened by sub-
dued export performance due to somewhat weaker
worldwide growth.
Some of the central banks in this region lowered their
interest rates in the course of last year. This was also
possible because currencies of some of the larger
countries appreciated, which alleviated inflation pres-
sures caused by oil price developments. In response to
accelerating inflation, only the central bank of the
Czech Republic raised its repo rate in autumn. How-
ever, at 2 percent it is still well below the level of
2.5 percent at the beginning of 2005. 
Since accession in May 2004, the ten new member
states have seen a clear increase in trade with the euro
area. Especially imports from the euro area in the new
member countries have seen an upward level shift (see
Figure 1.5). This is associated with substantial current
account deficits in many of the new member states.
The growth slowdown at the end of 2004 and during
the first half of last year clearly left its mark on trade
between these blocks. The composition of exports
and imports between the new member states and the
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euro area has, however, so far not been affected by
accession. With a share of around 60 percent of all
trade, intermediate goods are by far the most impor-
tant component of trade. The remaining part is more
or less equally split between capital goods and con-
sumption goods and services. 
Up until the end of 2001, the three largest new mem-
ber countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary, each held a share of approximately 26 percent
of total exports to the euro area coming from the ten
new member countries. After that, the relative posi-
tion of Hungary gradually deteriorated to around
22 percent, whereas the shares of
the other two countries rose to
around 28 percent in the last few
years. The relative importance of
the remaining seven new member
states roughly stayed the same.
With respect to imports from the
euro area, a similar picture
emerges. Whereas the Czech Re-
public took a gradually increas-
ing share of total imports,
Hungary experienced a steady
decline. But as this country also
experienced a level shift in espe-
cially imports from the euro area
in the second quarter of 2004, its
accession stimulated trade: the
Table 1.1 
The development of various measures of wages and wage costs
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a) Business sector. –
b) Nominal wage deflated by GDP deflator (i.e., real product wage). – 
c) Manufacturing sector. –
d)
Competitiveness– weighted relative unit labour costs in dollar terms. – 
e).Exports relative to export markets, a positive
number indicates gains in market shares and a negative number indicates a loss in market shares. – 
f) The figures for
Germany are compensations per employee and not wages.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 78 database.
Figure 1.5speed of (trade) integration, however, seems to lag
behind those of the others. The Czech Republic, on
the other hand, appears to be doing rather well on
this front. 
1.2 The global economy
United States 
The US economy seems to be on a stable expansion
course. Except for the last quarter of 2005, annualised
quarter-to-quarter growth rates of real GDP have
been above 3.3 percent for ten quarters in a row.
Neither hurricanes nor high oil prices appear to have
affected the dynamics of the US economy noticeably.
US GDP growth in 2005 reached 3.5 percent (after
4.2 percent in 2004). 
Growth was supported by all major demand compo-
nents. Households increased their spending by a solid
and stable 3.6 percent in 2005. The reduction in pur-
chasing power of households due to increased energy
prices has been compensated by an increase in dispos-
able income and a further reduction in the already low
saving rate. The latter can be partly explained by the
further increase in real estate prices. Moreover, labour
market conditions improved. The number of employ-
ees in non-agricultural sectors increased as compared
to 2004 by 11/2 percent at the end of last year. However,
the substantial rise in employment only reduced unem-
ployment to a small extent, as the number of people
searching for jobs increased as well. The unemploy-
ment rate was, on average, 5.1 percent, implying a
decrease of 0.4 percentage points over the year.
Although fixed investment could not quite keep up
with the high quarterly growth rates of 2004, it still
contributed strongly to overall growth in 2005.
Especially growth in equipment and software invest-
ments remained strong. Apparently, firms still feel the
need to invest, possess the necessary financial means
and harbour positive sales expectations. Furthermore,
residential investment expanded very strongly –
despite its already high level – in particular during the
first half of 2005. However, slower growth rates dur-
ing the second half of 2005 and recent survey results
point towards the long-expected correction of resi-
dential investment.
During the first part of 2005, the trade balance start-
ed to contribute positively to GDP growth for the first
time in almost two years. Hence, overall exports grew
at a slightly faster pace than imports, which allowed
the current account deficit to (temporarily) stabilise at
around 51/2 percent of GDP. Whereas exports, howev-
er, only grew moderately in the second half of 2005,
imports surged by roughly 9 percent in the final quar-
ter of 2005.
In spite of considerable economic growth, core infla-
tion, that is inflation corrected for its volatile compo-
nents energy and food, remained fairly stable. One of
the reasons is that the Federal Reserve, from June 2004
until January 2006, increased the federal funds rate in
14 small steps up to 4.5 percent. The Fed has thus
reversed the expansionary stance of monetary policy
taken since the recession of 2001. Monetary policy in
the US is soon about to reach an approximately neu-
tral course, according to most judgements. This rever-
sal could not prevent inflation expectations from
increasing and oil price hikes from causing substantial
increases in headline inflation, reaching a peak in
September with a rate of 4.7 percent.1 In November,
headline inflation decreased to 3.5 percent.
Japan, China and other Asia
During the first half of 2005, Japan continued its
recovery, which was only shortly interrupted by a mild
recession during the second half of 2004. Output
growth reached a record annualised quarterly rate of
5.7 percent in the first quarter. It remained close to
that level during the second quarter, but dropped sub-
stantially to levels of around 1 percent during the sub-
sequent quarters. GDP growth will probably be close
to 21/2 percent for the year as a whole (after 2.3 per-
cent in 2004). Nominal GDP did not grow as strong-
ly, indicating that deflation has not fully stopped yet.
However, as compared to 2004, deflation is likely to
have fallen further to an annual rate of close to 1 per-
cent. Producer price indices already have shown
increasing prices since early 2004. Also the fall in land
and real estate prices seem to have ceased in some
areas like Tokyo.
The Japanese recovery has since its beginning in 2002,
mainly been based on export growth. Japan has bene-
fited to a large extent from strong developments in
Asia and especially in China. During the second half
of 2004, however, exports started growing at a slower
pace, which – given the increased imports – implied a
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1 According to the September consumer survey of the University of
Michigan, inflation expectations increased to 3.2 percent, a value not
reached in the last ten years. Furthermore, the difference between the
nominal interest rate on non-indexed bonds and the real interest rate
on indexed-linked government bonds (which is a measure of expect-
ed inflation) widened last autumn.EEAG Report 17
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negative contribution to growth from net exports.
This development continued during the first quarter
of 2005. After that, exports accelerated again partly
due to increased foreign demand for Japanese cars.
High growth during the first half of 2005 was thus
mainly supported by domestic demand. After
exhibiting, on average, almost zero growth during the
last three quarters of 2004, private consumption
increased by respectively 4.9 and 2.9 percent during
the first two quarters of 2005.
The improvement in consumer
confidence was backed by an
increase in employment during
the first half of 2005. Both high-
er labour demand and demo-
graphic developments explain
the reduction in the rate of
unemployment. Since early 2003
it has decreased by more than 1
percentage point to 4.6 percent in
November last year. In particular
higher bonus payments due to
increased firm profits caused
nominal wages to increase during
the first half of 2005.
Private equipment investment,
too, revived after a weak second
half of 2004. This development is
mirrored by deliveries of capital
goods, which also show that in
particular industrial demand
increased strongly. The Tankan
report of the Bank of Japan
(2005) of December last year no
longer sees the over-capacity of manufacturing as
excessive and records a slight increase in business con-
fidence.
In the rest of Asia, year-to-year economic growth dur-
ing the second half of 2004 until the first quarter of
2005 fell somewhat. After that it increased slightly
again. The cause of the slowdown was a less strong
increase in exports (partly due to the continued weak-
ness of the global IT cycle), which
caused growth in investment
demand to fall substantially in
some of the Asian economies.
After the summer of 2005, trade
with IT goods picked up again.
However, due to the high energy
intensity of production in many
Asian countries, like South Korea
and  Thailand, the oil price
increase has proven to be a new
burden for these economies. Being
an oil-exporting economy, Indo-
nesia was the only Asian economy
to experience increased growth in
2005. With the exceptions of




Prices of crude oil continued their upward trend throughout the year. Damage to
oilfields and refineries caused by the hurricanes in the US induced further hikes in
prices of oil and related products like petrol. Despite the moderate slowdown of
world economic growth, as compared to 2004, actual prices are still high (see
Figure 1.6). It is to be expected that other reasons beside developments in world,
particularly Asian, oil demand are behind this. Actual prices, however, do not
appear to any large extent to be driven by speculation; the share of non-oil-sector-
related traders with crude oil futures is not larger than usual. Another plausible
explanation could be a further increase in the geo-political risk premium. However,
such risks have probably already been discounted in the price for some time and are
probably not higher than during the time of the US invasion in Iraq. A possibility
might be that the high degree of liquidity in financial markets worldwide also
affects markets for crude oil – as it has for real estate prices. What appears to be the
most likely explanation though is a large risk premium as a result of an uncertain
outlook with respect to future developments in oil production. Speculation about a
soon-to-be-reached peak in non-OPEC production cannot be easily dismissed.
Furthermore, whereas worldwide oil reserves on average increased by approximate-
ly 1.7 percent in the previous ten years, it almost stagnated last year. Finally, cost
increases of production and exploration might also have led to an overall higher
level of oil prices.  
Nevertheless, in the industrialised world higher oil prices will not cause as high
levels of inflation as was the case in the past. One reason is that central banks have
over time managed to keep inflation expectations at low and stable levels. 
Furthermore, increased competition due to globalisation and – in Europe – still 
relatively low capacity utilisation also prevent firms from fully passing on energy
price increases to consumers.
a)
a) For more details on this issue we refer to OECD (2005b).
Figure 1.6thereby financing a considerable part of the trade
account deficit of the US.
An important exception to this general tendency is
China. Official year-to-year real GDP growth rates in
the first two quarters of 2005 were 9.4 and 9.5 per-
cent, respectively. The annual growth rate for 2005
will equal 9.3 percent. In conformity with the objec-
tive of the Chinese government to dampen the invest-
ment boom in especially the steel, aluminium and
cement sectors, investment growth decreased to
around 27 percent. Private consumption, however,
expanded steadily and exports continued to grow fast
(with an average growth rate of more than 30 per-
cent). Import growth, on the other hand, saw a
decline until mid-2005, which was one of the reasons
for the relatively weak export performance of other
Asian economies. The current account surplus of
China exceeded 8 percent of
GDP in the first half of 2005.
China (as well as Malaysia) gave
up the fixed conversion rate of
the domestic currency to the US
dollar in July 2005. The policy
change created leeway for future
monetary policy change and may
be an important step towards the
integration of the Chinese finan-
cial sector into the international
capital markets. The official
exchange rate regime is now one
of managed floating against a
basket of foreign currencies. At
least for the time being, this has
not led to a substantial apprecia-
tion of the renmimbi against the
US dollar (see Box 1.2). 
After the high levels during 2004,
inflation in China has stabilised.
In other Asian economies, oil
price increases led to higher infla-
tion rates. In many of these
countries, central banks reacted
to this by increasing their key
interest rates.
The rest of the world
The business cycle upturn of
2004 in Latin America slowed
down somewhat during 2005
partly because prices of raw materials (except for oil
and gas) did not increase by as much as in 2004.
Furthermore, increased inflation risks affected the
business climate. Especially in Brazil, but also tem-
porarily in Mexico, central banks raised interest rates
in response. This also restrained domestic demand. In
most Latin American countries, fiscal policy is orient-
ed towards reducing budget deficits. Overall, the
investment climate in many of these economies never-
theless remained favourable.
The moderate slowdown in economic growth in
Russia starting in mid-2004 continued throughout
2005. Real GDP increased by 53/4 percent. Export
growth declined partly due to the reduced growth in
foreign demand for crude oil, but mainly because of
the real effective appreciation of the ruble by more




Chinese exchange rate reform
China’s increasing foreign exchange reserves have for a long time pointed towards
the renminbi being highly undervalued. Some calculations suggest that the
renminbi is undervalued by as much as 30 to 40 percent. A revaluation of the
renminbi against the dollar to head off protectionist moves by the US Congress and
to stem foreign speculative capital flows, which are partly responsible for the boom
in capital investment in China, was generally anticipated. Such a revaluation
against the dollar, by 2.1 percent, took place on 21 July 2005.
a) To increase flexi-
bility, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) also announced at the same time that it
will abandon its eleven-year-old peg with the US dollar and move to a managed
float against a (still unrevealed) basket of currencies. It was indicated that this
reference basket is dominated by currencies of China’s major trading partners,
which are the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro and the Korean won.
Each trading day, the PBoC will set the value of the renminbi relative to the
reference basket. Unlike the old system, where the central parity remained fixed,
the closing rate of each trading day becomes the next trading day’s fixed parity.
Each day, there is a ± 0.3 percent trading band around the US dollar. Theoretically,
the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar can therefore move as much as ± 1.5 per-
cent per week or ± 6 percent per month. Until the end of 2005, however, the PBoC
only allowed the renminbi to appreciate another  percent against the US dollar
since 21 July. It is suggested by the PBoC that trading prices of the non-US dollar
currencies against the renminbi are also allowed to only move within certain bands.
However, these bands have not been made public. Actual exchange rate
developments show much larger fluctuations of the renminbi with respect to other
currencies and appear to suggest that the bands vis-à-vis the US dollar are the 
effective ones. Floating exchange rates between these other currencies and the US
dollar imply that a system of multiple exchange rate bands for the renminbi cannot 
function.
Therefore, at present the new Chinese exchange rate regime looks very much like
the old. The appreciation against the dollar is too small to have a noticeable effect
on the Chinese-American trade balance. However, China has created itself more
room for manoeuvre in the future. While the PBoC will continue to come under
pressure to further revalue the currency, it is clear from official statements made in
the days after the initial revaluation that there are also counter pressures. The PBoC
is pressed to protect exporters against both the loss of competitiveness and a rising
renminbi debt burden for the Chinese economy.
This suggests that the PBoC is likely to allow the currency to appreciate very
gradually within the new framework for the next few years. But such modest
changes are unlikely to make a big difference to the Chinese-American trade 
balance.
a) The Chinese decision was almost immediately followed by Malaysia. It also moved from a
fixed exchange rate regime against the US dollar to a managed float against a basket of
currencies. Also other Asian currencies rose along with the renminbi against the US dollar.EEAG Report 19
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company Yukos may have had a
negative effect on oil production
as well as on the willingness to
invest in Russia. Domestic
demand nevertheless expanded
substantially. This was mainly
caused by the continued strong
expansion of private consump-
tion. As a large fraction of the oil
revenues goes to the public sec-
tor, they generated a government
budget surplus of 5 percent of
GDP in 2005. 
1.3 The international policy mix
Fiscal policy
With respect to fiscal policy, industrial countries on
average stayed on a more or less neutral course.
Just like in 2004, government deficits in many
economies hardly changed. Most governments are
still concerned about stabilising and eventually
reducing deficits. 
In the euro area, the aggregate structural and actual
deficits – despite the need for fiscal consolidation in
especially  France, Germany and  Italy – remained
broadly constant, that is between 2 and 21/2 percent of
GDP for the structural and around 2.9 percent for the
actual deficit (see Figure 1.7).2
For most member states, budget deficits only changed
by up to 1/2 percentage point in either direction (see
Table 1.2). Four exceptions, however, were Greece,
Italy, Portugal and Ireland. Ireland moved from a bud-
get surplus of 1.4 percent of GDP to a deficit close to
1/2 percent of GDP, but stayed well below the
Maastricht ceiling of 3 percent of GDP. Portugal –
already at that ceiling in 2004 – increased its deficit to
6.0 percent of GDP, which is the highest level record-
ed since 1994. In Italy, the budget deficit in percent of
Figure 1.7
Table 1.2 
Public budget indicators in the euro area
Gross debt
a) Financial  Balance
a)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Germany  61.2  64.8  66.4  68.6 70.0 – 3.8  – 4.1  – 3.7  – 3.9  – 3.7 
France  58.8  63.2  65.1  66.5 67.1 – 3.2  – 4.1  – 3.7  – 3.2  – 3.5 
Italy  108.3  106.8  106.5  106.6 108.3 – 2.7  – 3.2  – 3.2  – 4.3  – 4.2 
Spain  53.2  49.4  46.9  44.2 41.9 – 0.3  0.0  – 0.1  0.2  0.1 
Netherlands 51.3  52.6  53.1  54.0 54.2 – 2.0  – 3.2  – 2.1  – 1.8  – 1.9 
Belgium 105.4  100.4 96.2 94.9 91.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  –  0.3 
Austria  66.7  65.1  64.3  64.3 64.2 – 0.4  – 1.2  – 1.0  – 1.9  – 1.8 
Greece  111.6  108.8  109.3  107.9 106.8 – 4.9  – 5.7  – 6.6  – 3.7  – 3.8 
Finland  42.3 45.2 45.1 42.8 41.5 4.3 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.9 
Ireland  32.4  31.5  29.8  29.0 28.7 – 0.4  0.2  1.4  – 0.4  – 0.3 
Portugal 56.1  57.7  59.4  65.9 69.8 – 2.8  – 2.9  – 3.0  – 6.0  – 5.0 
Luxembourg 6.8  6.7  6.6  6.8  7.0  2.1  0.2  – 1.2  – 2.3  – 2.0 
Euro area  69.2  70.4  70.8  71.7 71.7 – 2.5  – 3.0  – 2.7  – 2.9  – 2.8 
United
Kingdom 38.2  39.7  41.5  43.1 44.3 – 1.6  – 3.3  – 3.1  – 3.4  – 3.3 
Sweden  52.4 52.0 51.1 50.6 49.4 –  0.3 0.2 1.6 1.4 0.8 
EU–15  62.5  64.0  64.3  65.1 65.2 – 2.2  – 2.9  – 2.6  – 2.7  – 2.7 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product and according to the definition in the Maastricht Treaty. Financial balances
without the special revenue gains from the sales of mobile phone licences in 2000–2002.
Source: European Commission.
2 The structural deficit is obtained by estimating government rev-
enues and expenditures assuming the economy is producing at its
potential level. We follow here the approach used by the OECD. See
also Chapter 2 of our 2003 report. GDP is likely to have increased from 3.2 in 2004 to at
least 4.3 last year. A revision of the Greek general
government accounts in the autumn of 2005 showed
that the budget deficit was as large as 6.6 percent of
GDP in 2004. Thus, a deficit of
probably between 31/2 and 4 per-
cent of GDP in 2005 will repre-
sent an improvement in the pub-
lic sector fiscal balance. 
Fiscal policy in the United King-
dom was on an expansive course
during 2005. The budget deficit
turned out to be 3.4 percent of
GDP. 
From 2001 to 2004, the fiscal pol-
icy stance in the United States
was expansionary. In the 2005 fis-
cal year (which ended September
2005), fiscal policy was slightly
restrictive. The clear decline of
the federal budget deficit from
3.6 percent of GDP in 2004 to
2.6 percent in 2005 can be mainly
attributed to a substantial in-
crease in income and corporate
tax receipts and is therefore not
reflected in the structural budget
deficit (see Figure 1.8). 
Japan continued to run the
largest structural fiscal deficit
among the OECD countries. In
2005, both structural and actual
deficits amounted to around
6 percent of GDP. These deficits
are clearly unsustainable. 
Monetary conditions and 
financial markets
Monetary conditions in the
United States, on the one hand,
and in Japan and the euro area,
on the other, moved in opposite
directions for most of 2005.
While the European Central
Bank left its target rate again un-
changed at 2 percent until early
December and the Bank of Japan
continued its zero interest rate
policy, the US Federal Reserve
kept raising the Federal funds rate (Figure 1.9). In the
United Kingdom, a cooling down of the economy last
year made the Bank of England reverse its course in
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points to 4.5 percent. However, as the inflation rate
has been declining only recently and modestly, while
retail sales have strengthened somewhat, it is not like-
ly that an additional interest rate decrease will follow
soon.
The slowdown of economic growth in the euro area
since the second half of 2004 and until summer last
year has been stronger than expected in our last
report. Despite the record level of consumer prices for
petrol and fuel oil, the prospects for a stable price
development did not deteriorate. The depreciation of
the euro against the dollar by more than 12 percent
(see Figure 1.11) has led to more expansive monetary
policy conditions than we predicted last year. This,
together with improved business cycle conditions in
the second half of last year and the more optimistic
economic outlook, induced the ECB to raise its main
interest rates by 25 basis points in December 2005.
This policy move is discussed in
greater detail in Section 3.1. 
Not only money market, and
thereby short-term, interest rates
stayed at a low level in the euro
area (see Figure 1.3). Also long-
term interest rates did not reverse
course during most of the year.
On the contrary, despite stable
money market rates, continued
strong demand led to an addi-
tional fall of long-term govern-
ment bond yields by another
0.5 percentage points until Sep-
tember 2005 in the euro area (see
Figure 1.10). In the United
States, long-term interest rates
hardly changed. Together with
the increased money market in-
terest rates, this led to an even
stronger flattening of the yield
curve than in Europe. In the past
years, the yield curve in the Unit-
ed States was always steeper than
in the euro area. Since the begin-
ning of 2005 this no longer holds.
In the final quarter, long-term
interest rates picked up world-
wide, induced by somewhat ris-
ing yields on US government
bonds, as some concerns about
inflation risks were spreading.
Between November and the end
of 2005, however, yields declined
again by about half of their previous rise. Despite the
robust economic growth and strong increases in ener-
gy prices, long-term inflation pressures hardly appear
to be a concern in financial markets.
Probably triggered by the increasing US money mar-
ket interest rates, the US dollar left its depreciation
course of the past three years and appreciated against
all major currencies, including the euro, during most
of 2005 (see Figure 1.11). Only between the end of
July, when the Chinese government gave up the fixed
exchange rate of the renminbi to the US dollar, and
the beginning of September, did the US dollar lose
part of its previous gain. This development does not
suggest that financial investors are very concerned
about the large current account deficit of the US (see
Chapter 2 for further discussion). For the euro-dollar
exchange rate an obvious explanation is the increase
in the interest rate differential in favour of the dollar. 
Figure 1.11
Figure 1.12Stock markets tended to rise throughout 2005 (see
Figure 1.12). Like in 2004, the rise was not compara-
ble to the strong recovery in 2003. However, while the
Dow Jones Industrial Average Index hardly went up,
both the German DAX share index and the Euro
Stoxx 50 developed roughly as strong as in 2003.
Unexpectedly high business profits and persistently
low interest rates were the driving forces behind this.
Even the terrorist attacks in London in early July and
the appreciation of the Chinese renminbi did not
affect stock markets in a significant way. Initially, the
increasing oil prices also did not appear to worry
investors. However, when in August the price for
crude oil surpassed the 60-dollar threshold and
threatened to rise above 70 dollars, markets were
affected, causing many stock market indices to tem-
porarily lose part of their previous gains.
2. The economic outlook for 2006
2.1 The global economy
Economic growth in the European Union is expected
to continue at a moderate pace in 2006. This is based
on the following assumptions and assessments:
• During the first half of 2006, the US Federal
Reserve will further increase its key interest rates
somewhat. The Bank of Japan will, in the current
year, gradually reduce the unusually generous sup-
ply of liquidity without increasing its key interest
rate. 
• The ECB is expected to further increase its interest
rates during 2006. However, it has made clear that
the decision in early December 2005 is not neces-
sarily the start of a series of
interest rate increases as was
the case in the US. The exact
timing will probably, to a
large extent, depend upon
exchange rate and oil price
developments. Long-term in-
terest rates on both sides of
the Atlantic will follow mone-
tary policy decisions, keeping
the yield curve relatively flat
but stable.
• Fiscal policy will in most
industrialised countries have a
more or less neutral stance
(see Figure 1.8). In the United
States, expenditures on “freely
disposable” items outside the defence ministry are
scheduled to be reduced. However, at the same
time the government is aiming for additional tax
cuts. The additional expenditures reserved for the
damages caused by the hurricanes make it uncer-
tain whether the slightly restrictive fiscal policy
stance of last year will be maintained in the near
future. In the United Kingdom, a slight tightening
of fiscal policy is scheduled. The government plans
to reduce the budget deficit to a level of below
3 percent of GDP during the fiscal year 2006. In
the euro area, existing structural deficits are likely
to remain more or less unchanged (see Section 3).
The consolidation of public finances in Japan will
be reinforced substantially.
• GDP growth in Asia in 2006 is likely to be more or
less the same as last year. The revival of the global
IT cycle at the end of 2005 and the beginning of
2006 could support exports from the region.
However, the high oil price – given the higher ener-
gy intensity of these countries as compared to the
OECD – will most likely lead to a further tightening
of monetary policy. Fiscal consolidation in many
Asian economies will keep the room for fiscal stim-
uli quite restricted. Furthermore, expansionary
impulses from the US will subside somewhat. In
China, the government will continue its policy of
dampening investment demand in specific industries
to achieve a more balanced growth pattern. Partly
due to a small further appreciation of the renminbi
against the US dollar, Chinese growth will be slight-
ly lower than before. This assessment is confirmed
by the 4th quarter 2005 Ifo World Economic Survey
results for China (see Figure 1.13).
• The oil price will fluctuate around its present level
of 60 US dollars per barrel. 
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• The euro/dollar exchange rate will fluctuate
around its present level of 1.20 dollar per euro (see
Figure 1.11).
• Given the above assumptions and the slightly less
optimistic expectations as reported by participants
of the Ifo World Economic Climate survey, world
economic growth is likely to slow down somewhat
during the course of 2006. Relatively higher
growth at the end of last year implies a similar
annual growth rate as last year, that is 41/2 percent
(see Figure 1.14). World trade is expected to
expand by around 7 percent in 2006.
Given the monetary and fiscal developments, the
US will grow less strongly in 2006 than in 2005.
Especially private consumption is likely to expand
at a slower rate. As increased interest rates will make
consumer credit more expensive and dampen
growth in real estate prices, the saving rate is expect-
ed to gradually increase. Inflation will cause real
disposable income to grow at only a moderate pace.
Higher long-term interest rates and slightly deterio-
rated sales and profit expectations will reduce
investment growth only slightly as business expecta-
tions are still favourable. The current account deficit
might improve somewhat due to lower domestic
demand growth and a small effective depreciation of
the dollar. Overall, with a rate of 3.4 percent in 2006
(after 3.5 percent in 2005), actual growth will be
roughly equal to potential growth in the US. With
an expanding labour force, unemployment is expect-
ed to hardly decrease. The inflation rate will, in the
course of this year, decrease somewhat to below
3 percent. 
Supported by domestic and for-
eign demand, the overall expan-
sion of the Japanese economy is
expected to continue at a similar-
ly high pace as last year.
Improved labour market condi-
tions and increased income will
stimulate private consumption.
Investment will rise strongly in
view of the improved sales and
profit expectations. In addition,
the banking sector has experi-
enced higher returns in the recent
past, allowing it to expand lend-
ing. Real GDP is expected to
grow by 2.4 percent in 2006.
Japan appears to have overcome
its structural problems to a large
extent and is heading for relative-
ly stable growth. The negative effects of deflation will
gradually abate as inflation is expected to be 0.3 per-
cent this year.
Overall, growth in China will – despite somewhat
lower investment growth – hardly weaken. The mea-
sures taken by the Chinese government to prevent the
economy from overheating seem to be sufficient. In
2006, GDP is likely to expand by 81/2 percent (as com-
pared to 9.3 percent last year). 
The economic expansion of the other Asian
economies will accelerate somewhat. Real GDP of the
region is expected to increase by approximately
41/2 percent this year, as compared to 4 percent last
year. 
Stability-oriented fiscal and monetary policies in
most parts of the Latin-American region improve its
economic outlook. In several Latin-American coun-
tries, government budget deficits are being reduced
and foreign reserves are increasing. Current accounts
mostly show surpluses. The high prices of raw materi-
als keep benefiting countries like Brazil with heavy
such exports. Real GDP growth in Latin America will
slow down somewhat overall from 4 percent last year
to 31/2 percent this year. 
The further expected strong appreciation of the rou-
ble will make the Russian economy less competitive.
This effect is partly alleviated by much more expan-
sive fiscal policy. Part of the stabilisation funds in
which some of the oil receipts flow will be used to
improve the health care system. Furthermore, salaries
Figure 1.14in the public sector will increase sharply. In Russia,
economic growth will fall from 53/4 percent last year to
51/2 percent this year. 
Risks and uncertainties
The forecast risks are basically the same as last year.
The internal buoyancy forces in the European Union
and Japan are still not strongly fortified and the situ-
ation in markets for crude oil stays tense. Government
bond yields are extremely low, real estate prices have
kept rising in a large number of countries and the US
current account deficit is not expected to decrease sig-
nificantly this year. Existing external imbalances
could trigger, for instance, a sharp depreciation of the
dollar. Such a sudden correction would have strong
effects on both financial markets and the real econo-
my (see Chapter 2 for further discussion). Moreover,
the Chinese economy could face a hard landing rather
than the assumed soft slowdown. This would also
reduce world economic growth. Hence, the following
forecast for the European economy is based on rela-
tively favourable external assumptions, and major
downside risks remain. These risks are difficult to
quantify.
2.2 The European economy in 2006
Supply-side improvements and risks
Despite the continued recovery of the European econ-
omy, the cyclical slack will remain large. Potential
growth is still lacking the dynamics observed else-
where in the world, as extensively discussed in
Chapter 3. Whereas reducing cyclical slack requires
that the overall stance of macro policies is not tight-
ened too quickly in the upswing, the achievement of
high potential growth requires further structural
reforms. These should aim at improving the function-
ing of markets both for labour (by eliminating rigidi-
ties, as recommended in earlier EEAG reports, and by
increasing the efficiency of education, as discussed in
Chapter 4 of this report) and for products and ser-
vices (by lowering barriers for competition, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 of this report). 
Business conditions have improved significantly over
the last couple of years. Equity prices have been
trending upwards since early 2003 and real interest
rates have been historically low since the end of 2001.
Given low inflation expectations and the continued
cyclical slack, wage demands are moderate. As a
result, unit labour costs have been restrained. These
conditions will remain throughout 2006 and keep
conditions for investment financing quite favourable
(see Table 1.1). 
However, so far these developments have hardly been
reflected in actual business investment. The fierce
competition faced by European firms in export and
home markets together with the rising energy prices
have put pressure on profit margins. This can at least
partly explain why the expected rise in fixed invest-
ment did not materialise in Europe last year. 
Another more structural cause could be that with
European enlargement and the ongoing globalisation
process, a greater share of total business investment
has and will be shifted to the new EU countries and
Asian countries, where labour costs are much lower.
Investment in the euro area could therefore remain
lower than in previous economic recoveries. 
Recognising the need to adapt to changing world eco-
nomic conditions, a number of European countries
have implemented – or are still in the process of imple-
menting – reforms to make especially labour markets
more flexible and to reduce overall red tape. However,
it will require time for these new measures to become
effective and the amount of reforms is still insufficient
(see Chapter 3 of this report). Nevertheless, labour
market developments in the euro area during 2005
were somewhat stronger than expected in our report
last year. As aggregate demand did not outperform
our expectations, we reckon that these can be seen as
first moderate signs of success, indicating that politi-
cal opposition against such reform efforts should be
resisted. Further structural reforms – as proposed in
previous EEAG reports – are urgent in order to fur-
ther raise employment rates over the medium term, in
particular as the employment target set in Lisbon in
2000 to increase the total employment rate (of those
aged 15 to 64) to 70 percent by 2010 still seems out of
reach. In 2004, the total employment rate in the euro
area stood at 63 percent, which implies that each year
this ratio is required to increase by, on average, more
than 1 percentage point if the Lisbon goal is to be
achieved. Since 2000, the average increase has been
less than 0.4 percentage points per year. 
Development of demand components in the euro area
This year the restraining effects of higher oil prices
are likely to gradually abate. Current and leading
indicators point towards an improved business cycle
development in the last part of 2005 and the first half
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of this year. For instance, survey data compiled in the
last quarter of 2005 show that assessments of actual
and future business situations have improved (see
Figure 1.16). Even for Germany
both dimensions of recent busi-
ness survey results point to an
upturn in the manufacturing
industry (see Figure 1.15). 
The depreciation of the euro last
year has improved competitive-
ness of the euro area. Also given
the continued strong world econ-
omy, exports are expected to
grow at increasing rates. Im-
proved domestic demand will
also stimulate imports. Export
growth will be higher than import
growth, thereby letting net ex-
ports make a positive contribu-
tion to GDP growth with 0.2 per-
centage points (as compared to a
contribution of – 0.1 percentage
points in 2005). However, a good
part of European exports is
intra-European, and as Europe is
forecasted to remain less dynam-
ic than other regions in the world
(see Figure 1.17), the export mar-
kets of European countries will
expand less than world trade.
Stable oil prices will allow profit
margins to improve. Together with
increased foreign demand as well
as continued favourable financing
conditions, we expect – with a
growth rate of 3 percent – a
stronger increase in investment
than we have seen in the past five
years. However, due to cyclical
slack most investments will not be
intended to increase capacity, but
rather to rationalise and mod-
ernise existing capital to be able to
sustain the increased global com-
petition. Given weak investment
over the past years, there is
mounting pressure to modernise
the capital stock.
Gradually improving labour
market conditions and moderate
wage increases will allow private consumption growth
to increase somewhat in the course of the year. On
average, private consumption is expected to increase
Figure 1.15
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Figure 1.17by 1.4 percent in 2006, as com-
pared to 1.3 percent last year.
The energy price increases will
continue to have a negative after-
effect on consumption during the
first half of this year.
Growth, employment and inflation
Leading indicators point to some
improvement in cyclical condi-
tions over the near term. Real
GDP growth in the euro area is
expected to increase to around
2 percent this year, as compared
to 1.4 percent in 2005 (Figure
1.18). Growth will marginally
exceed its earlier trend, so the
output gap (measured relative to
trend output) will start to shrink.
The growth gap between the
European Union and the United
States will narrow somewhat.
For the fourth year in a row,
Japan is likely to outperform
Europe when it comes to overall
GDP growth (Figure 1.17). 
After a significant decrease dur-
ing 2005, the unemployment rate
in the euro area will only be
reduced slightly this year as
employment growth is expected
to remain modest (Figure 1.19).
The unemployment rate will
decline moderately to a level of
somewhat above 8 percent in the
euro area at the end of the year
(see Figure 1.20). 
Assuming a stable oil price, the
annual inflation rate in the euro
area over the year will fall back
to slightly below 2 percent for
this and the next year, after
2.2 percent last year. 
Differences in output growth 
within Europe
Despite the general recovery in the euro area (and in
the European Union as a whole), there are significant
differences in the growth performance among countries
(see Figure 1.21). Whereas Ireland, Luxembourg,
Finland, Spain and  Greece will keep experiencing
growth rates above 3 percent, Italy, Portugal and Ger-
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Beside cyclical slack, structural problems appear to be
a main cause of the low-growth performance of Italy,
Germany and Portugal. Despite the fact that previous
labour market reforms have caused employment in
Italy to expand significantly, there is still a high degree
of resistance against removing rigidities in labour,
product, and services markets and reducing red tape.
The initial decline in interest payments in Italy’s fiscal
budget due to lower interest rates accruing from
EMU qualification has over time been used to finance
additional spending without reducing the high debt
burden to a sufficient degree. Also in Germany, the fis-
cal deficit appears to a large extent to be of a struc-
tural nature. Key factors here are the weakness in
labour markets and the need for continued wage mod-
eration. As tax and social security revenues rely heav-
ily on wage income, the revenue
base of the public sector is erod-
ing. At the same time, high and
long-lasting unemployment bene-
fits and social transfers put pres-
sure on expenditure. This shows
that important synergies exist
between public finances, the
labour market, and social securi-
ty reform. In Portugal, lagging
productivity growth, strong wage
increases in the past, and rising
competition from emerging mar-
ket countries have eroded exter-
nal competitiveness. In Italy,
Germany and Portugal, domestic
demand remains relatively weak. 
The near-term outlook for
France has improved and GDP
growth is expected to average
about 2 percent this year. Im-
provements in the business envi-
ronment will help sustain invest-
ment, and the weaker euro will
draw in additional external
demand. 
Real GDP growth in the UK will
increase to 2.4 percent this year
(after 1.7 percent in 2005). In-
creasing disposable income will
stimulate consumption and nev-
ertheless allow room for the sav-
ing rate to rise again. Investment
is likely to recover.
Economic growth in the new EU
member states will revive somewhat in 2006. Real
GDP is expected to increase, on average, by around
41/2 percent (as compared to 4.2 percent in 2005).
Private consumption growth will accelerate and
investment – also due to the more expansionary mon-
etary policy stance in many of these countries – will
expand strongly. Increased international trade with
the  euro area in particular will stimulate these
economies. Inflation will be moderate, but probably
higher than is allowed according to the convergence
criteria for EMU entry. 
In the Czech Republic further interest rate increases
will put upward pressure on its currency. The resur-
gence in private consumption and capital investment
Figure 1.21will keep growth at a level of around 41/2 percent. Not
only monetary policy but also productivity improve-
ments will keep inflation low. As domestic demand
strengthens, the current account deficit will increase
further.
Economic growth in the largest
new EU member state, Poland, is
forecasted to increase to 4 per-
cent this year. Inflation will
remain low as high unemploy-
ment continues to limit infla-
tionary pressures. 
3. Macroeconomic policy
Our macroeconomic forecast is
thus one of a modest recovery in
the euro area in 2006, with actual
output growing slightly faster
than potential output (see
Box 1.3). In 2007, the pace of the
recovery is likely to be similar. As
compared to other regions in the
world, the cyclical upturn is fair-
ly modest. At the same time
potential growth is relatively low.
Raising potential growth in the
euro area will require structural
reforms in labour, product and
services markets. This has been a
recurrent theme in previous
EEAG reports. In this report,
growth-enhancing reforms in
product and services markets as
well as of education systems are
analysed in Chapters 3–5. Many
of these reforms can be accom-
plished at low budgetary costs
and can therefore be pursued
despite tight fiscal positions in
most member states. Progress
with product market reforms to
reduce prices will also help cush-
ion the impact of wage modera-
tion – assisting firms to survive in
globalised markets – on worker
real incomes. 
With respect to cyclical stabilisa-
tion, there are two fundamental
issues to be addressed. The first concerns the appro-
priate aggregate stance of demand policy. For that we
need to analyse the demand effects of monetary and
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cerns the appropriate balance between monetary and
fiscal policy. The first issue is more difficult to analyse
in view of the uncertainties regarding future price and
output developments. It is easier to form a view on the
appropriate monetary-fiscal-policy mix, but difficult
to see how it would be implemented.
3.1 Monetary policy
The overall fiscal policy stance in
the  euro area – as measured by
cyclically adjusted government
net lending – is expected to remain
more or less unchanged over
2006–07 (see Figure 1.7). Under
that – from our point of view –
realistic assumption, changes in
the aggregate demand policy
stance will mainly be determined
by monetary policy. A lively dis-
cussion on this was triggered by
the decision of the ECB in
December last year to raise its
refinancing rate from 2 to
2.25 percent. Although the Presi-
dent of the ECB made clear in the
accompanying press conference
that the move did not signal any
ex-ante decision to initiate a series
of increases, it is generally be-
lieved that a further tightening of
monetary policy is likely.
The ECB has motivated the inter-
est rate rise by upside inflation
risks relating to “uncertainties
arising from oil market develop-
ments, the pass-through of previ-
ous oil price increases to con-
sumers via the domestic produc-
tion chain, the possibility of sec-
ond-round effects in wage and
price-setting behaviour, as well as
further increases in administered
prices and indirect taxes” (ECB
2005). In addition, reference was
made to large increases in mone-
tary aggregates related to high
credit demand (in particular for
mortgage loans) (see Figure 1.25).
The immediate aim of the policy
change was presented as “keeping
medium to long-term inflation
expectations anchored at levels
consistent with price stability”.
It is, in our view, difficult to gauge whether or not the
interest rate rise was premature given the definition of
price stability (an inflation rate below, but close to,
two percent in the medium term) chosen by the ECB.
Box 1.3 
Trend and cycle in the euro area 
For the evaluation of monetary and fiscal policy, it is necessary to assess potential 
GDP and the output gap (the difference between actual and potential output). In the 
following, using different time-series methods, a decomposition of real GDP for the
euro area into trend and cyclical components is carried out for the period 1970 to
2005.
The most used procedure for the extraction of the trend component from the
observed time series of real GDP is the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter (HP). The 
trend is determined such that, on the one hand, it does not deviate too far from the
actual development and, on the other hand, displays a smooth course. The relative 
weight of the second requirement (smoothness of the trend component) is control-
led via a smoothing parameter that must be set á priori. For annual data a parameter
value of 100 is usually set (HP100).
The Rotemberg (1999) filter (RO) is constructed – similar to the Hodrick-Prescott
filter – such that the trend has a smooth course; the smoothness parameter is
calculated such that the change of trend growth within n years is independent of the
current cyclical component. On the other hand, the covariance between the cyclical
components in a specified time distance k is to be minimal. The Rotemberg filter
produces, as a rule a very regular course of the trend growth rates. In accordance
with Rotemberg’s proposal, values of four years for k and one year for n are used
(RO(4.1)).
Another class of filters is based on the idea that time series can be represented as
the sum of oscillations of different frequencies. It is often argued that the cyclical
component consists of all oscillations with periodicities of between two and eight
years (Baxter and King 1999). Estimates with this setting, however, display trend
growth rates for euro area GDP that again have strong oscillations with a
periodicity of about 9 years. For this reason the results for the cyclical component
presented in the following are based on extracted oscillations of between 2 and
12 years. Since an “ideal” filter for the measurement of the cyclical component
requires an infinitely long observation period in theory, it cannot be constructed in
practice. Therefore a number of approximation methods are proposed. The Baxter
and King filter (BK) is based on the approach that sets the cyclical component (and
symmetrically also the trend component) as a finite moving average with
symmetrical weights. For the extraction of the unobserved components, Baxter and
King recommend using three years before and three years after the respective date.
At the end of the sample, a component calculation is thus no longer possible. The 
problem is “solved” by employing forecasted values for three years. With the 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999) filter (CF), the trend component depends on all
observed values of the sample. With this procedure, component estimates without 
additional forecasting can be carried out at the end of the sample. However, these 
estimates are extremely unreliable.
Finally a univariate unobserved components model (UC) is estimated. Here the
observed time series of real GDP is decomposed into a trend component, a cyclical
component and an irregular component. Every one of these components is specified
as a stochastic process and the model is estimated by using the Kalman filter. The 
results presented in the following are based on a model in which the trend
component is specified as a random walk of the second order and in which two 
cycles are allowed. The estimated periodicity of the short cycle is about 4 years;
that of the long cycle about 9 years.
For the calculation of the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the Rotemberg filter, the Baxter-
King filter and the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter for the year 2005, predicted values
are used for real GDP in 2006-08. A growth rate of 2 percent is assumed for 2006,
and 2.2 percent for 2007 and 2008. Lower growth rates alter the results for 2005
only slightly.
Figure 1.23 and Figure 1.24 show that the individual methods supply different
results. A general result is that the trend growth rate declined in the past five years.
In 2000 the estimates were between 2.0 and 2.5 percent (at an average value of
2.2 percent), in 2005 between 1.5 and 2.1 percent (average value: 1.75 percent).
The trend growth rate decreased in the past five years by nearly half a percentage
point.What is clear, however, is that the interest rate move
raises a number of questions which should be openly
discussed.3
A first issue concerns the responses to the oil price
increases. If one regards them as a temporary supply
shock, an overshooting of the inflation ceiling has to
be accepted in the short run. Some reaction to a tem-
porary supply shock can be part of the policy
response. Monetary policy should react strongly to
any increases in inflation expectations above target
but only moderately to changes in output gap expec-
tations. The choice of speed of adjustment back to
equilibrium can be an additional consideration.
According to the ECB’s own forecast after the
December 2005 interest rate increase (assuming an
unchanged interest rate in the future), headline infla-
tion in 2007 will be between 1.4 and 2.6 percent (the
mid point of the band thus being exactly 2 percent).
This is in line with our estimate of 1.9 percent for this
and next year. The ECB does not
itself publish output gap calcula-
tions, but according to our own
estimates there will still be a neg-
ative gap of 1/2 percent of poten-
tial GDP this year, which will
then approximately close in 2007.
These forecasts do not give clear
guidance to assessing the appro-
priateness of the interest rate
increase in December 2005 by the
ECB. This is because inflation
expectations are at best only
slightly above target, whereas
output gap forecasts are slightly
negative. A further question to be
asked is whether it would have
been more appropriate to trade
off a slower reduction of infla-
tion against an even smaller loss
of output over this horizon. The
counter-argument would be that
this potentially allows inflation
expectations to surge. 
Similar issues concern the mone-
tary policy responses to VAT
changes. It is estimated that the
planned German VAT increase of
three percentage points in 2007
will have a non-negligible effect of approximately
0.3 percentage points on headline inflation in the euro
area.4 Interpreting the VAT increase as a supply shock
suggests that a direct response to it is not necessarily
inappropriate. However, the more important issue is
whether the VAT increase leads to higher inflation
expectations. The 0.3 percentage point increase in the
CPI is a purely mechanical calculation that neither
takes the demand nor the supply effects into account.
The VAT increase could be seen by the private sector
as a one-time shock that has only a small effect on
inflation expectations. So it is unlikely that expected
inflation for 2007 will rise by as much. In addition, the
VAT increase also affects the equilibrium level of out-
put, the output gap and expectations of them, but
there are no estimates of these effects. 
A third issue has to do with the estimates of potential
output. The ECB President, Trichet, pointed out at
the press conference after the 2005 interest rate rise




3 Here, the ECB’s lack of transparency is an obstacle to such an
informed discussion, as the bank’s deliberations are not fully dis-
closed. See De Haan et al. (2005) for a further discussion.
4 This estimate includes the effects of the accompanying decrease in
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Chapter 1
of potential output growth in the euro area need to be
adjusted downwards (from close to 2.5 percent to
somewhere closer to 2 percent).5 This implies that the
ECB considers the euro area output gap to have been
overestimated in the past. If the downward revisions
of potential output growth apply to a longer earlier
period, the ECB may even believe that there does not
exist any significant negative output gap at present.
As elaborated in Box 1.3, we estimate potential out-
put growth to be even below 2 percent. This in turn
implies that – given the assumed increases in the
ECB’s interest rates during 2006 and the forecasted
economic development – there will indeed be no out-
put gap left in 2007. Also, if one believes the recent oil
price increases to be permanent, they may reduce
potential output further. This would provide argu-
ments for tightening monetary policy. On the other
hand, recent labour market reforms in some countries
– although insufficient – may have increased equilib-
rium employment, which is a key determinant of
potential output. This may apply to Germany in par-
ticular, where unemployment benefit levels have been
reduced and stricter requirements imposed on the
unemployed. In addition, the productive potential
may have increased due to lengthening of working
hours in some parts of the economy, as discussed in
last year’s EEAG report.6 Although very difficult to
estimate, there is a need for an open discussion of how
large output gaps are believed to be, since they are
crucial for judging future inflation risks.
A fourth issue is how best to deal in actual policy with
the uncertainties that always surround output gaps.
The Greenspan method in the US in the 1990s was to
test the estimates of output gaps “on the upside” by
allowing actual output to increase above convention-
al estimates of potential output (and employment to
increase above conventional estimates of its equilibri-
um level) and then watch what happened to inflation.
When it did not increase, the policy experiment could
be repeated and employment be allowed to expand
further. This policy is often credited with having con-
tributed to high growth in the US in the 1990s. The
inclination of the ECB seems to be the reverse one of
preferring errors “on the downside” and for safety’s
sake rather accept a negative than a positive output
gap. This is understandable in view of the fact that the
ECB has not so far been able to bring headline infla-
tion below the two percent ceiling, but it carries with
it the risk that demand is held unnecessarily low (even
given the structural rigidities characterising the euro
area economies). This may be a price that is paid for
such a low inflation objective that small deviations of
actual inflation from it carry little information
regarding the output gap and thus the long-run infla-
tion risks: this would be the case if nominal rigidities
make inflation at low rates unresponsive to changes in
cyclical conditions, so that small variations in infla-
tion are then mainly determined by “noise”.7
Another issue is what role the so-called “first pillar”in
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy is actually play-
ing: according to that, the annual increase of broad
money (M3) should not normally exceed a reference
value of 41/2 percent. Money growth since 2001 has
consistently exceeded this value (see Figure 1.25). The
monetary pillar has been heavily criticised as a guide
for future inflation, because the relationship between
money growth and inflation is quite unstable, at least
as long as inflation is at moderate levels. At best, the
monetary pillar does not add any information addi-
tional to that of an inflation forecast based on all rel-
evant factors. Despite that, the ECB has often used
monetary developments to motivate interest rate deci-
sions, although the monetary pillar does not – accord-
ing to recent research – appear to have played any sig-
nificant role for actual policy decisions.8 Hence, it
may not have done much harm. However, in the moti-
vations for the December 2005 interest rate increase,
references to recent rapid money growth again fea-
tured prominently. 
Finally, the way the December 2005 interest rate deci-
sion was communicated has been criticised in the
media and by ECB watchers. Already a fortnight
before the actual ECB Governing Council meeting in
which the decision supposedly was made, its
President, Trichet, made public statements about the
move at hand, which basically did not allow any other
decision in December to be made without a loss of
credibility. This action was initially seen by many
observers as the start of a series of interest rate
increases. After the press conference, the opposite
belief that no further interest rate changes were to be
expected settled in. Additional statements by ECB
officials during the next few days were needed to
make clear that the ECB, of course, is always com-
mitted to increasing interest rates if inflation risks
5 Trichet (2005).
6 The fact that hourly wage costs in Germany remained more or less
constant in 2005 (see Table 1.1) might be an indication of an increase
in the equilibrium rate of employment.
7 This point has been made by De Grauwe (2002) in particular.
8 De Haan et al. (2005) report that monetary developments on sev-
eral occasions have been used to justify interest rate decisions. In an
econometric analysis, Berger et al. (2006) show that, despite much
discussion devoted to monetary issues in the introductory state-
ments, money growth has hardly affected the overall policy stance
and actual interest decisions.rise. Hence, instead of improving predictability – as
was the official position of the ECB – the early state-
ment by the ECB president this time tended to induce
confusion.
3.2 Fiscal policy
Fiscal policy in the euro area in 2003-05 has been
characterised by an aggregate budget deficit close to
3 percent of GDP (see Table 1.2). As a consequence,
the earlier trend towards a reduction of the aggregate
government debt-to-GDP ratio has been broken and
the government debt ratio has started to increase
again (reaching close to 72 percent in 2005, see Figure
1.22). Budget developments have differed consider-
ably among countries, but aggregate euro area devel-
opments have been dominated by the deficits and
debt increases in the three largest economies: France,
Germany and Italy.
A similar situation is likely to prevail in the coming
years. Aggregate euro area government net borrowing
is forecast to remain close to 3 percent of GDP and
the aggregate government debt ratio may at best sta-
bilise around the present level. 
The euro area fiscal situation is worrying. The prima-
ry reason is the future budget pressures from demo-
graphic developments, as has been discussed in earlier
EEAG reports.9 One important adjustment mecha-
nism is to reduce government debt substantially
before demographic pressures set in with full force.
There is a serious risk of underestimating the need for
this because low interest rates are currently holding
down interest costs for government debt. This has
been reflected by a reduction in interest payments on
government debt by 0.7 percent of GDP (from 3.9 to
3.2) between 2001 and 2005 in the euro area. As a con-
sequence, there has been a smaller deterioration in the
overall budget balance (from – 1.8 to – 2.9 percent of
GDP between 2001 and 2005) than of the primary
balance (from 2.0 percent of GDP to 0.3 percent).
Although the reasons for the currently low long-term
interest rates are not well understood (see our discus-
sion in Chapter 2), it is risky to count on interest rates
remaining as low as they are now (relative to GDP
growth) (see Figure 1.3). 
Government debt developments will be highly vulner-
able to rising interest rates. With a government debt-
to-GDP ratio of 72 percent in the euro area, a rise in
the average interest rate on government debt relative
to GDP growth by one percentage point would under
otherwise equal circumstances cause an increase in
the debt-to-GDP ratio by 8 percentage points over a
ten-year period. A rise by two percentage points
would cause an increase by 17 percentage points. 
3.3 The mix between fiscal and monetary policy
One can also view the fiscal policy problem as the
result of a co-ordination failure with monetary policy.
There is ample empirical evidence that monetary and
fiscal policies are so-called strategic substitutes.10 This
implies both that more expansionary fiscal policy trig-
gers more contractive monetary policy and that more
contractive monetary policy triggers more expansion-
ary fiscal policy.11 The conclusion is that the euro area
budget deficits during the recent downturn prevented
the ECB from lowering interest rates more than was
done. At the same time, this monetary policy provid-
ed incentives for fiscal policy makers to run larger
budget deficits than would otherwise have been the
case. 
The co-ordination failure of monetary and fiscal poli-
cies in the euro area is likely to persist during the com-
ing recovery. In the absence of more restrictive fiscal
policy, monetary policy will be tightened instead. And
the tightening of monetary policy will weaken the
incentives for fiscal consolidation. It would be a much
better policy mix – in terms of preparing for future
demographic pressures and stimulating growth-
enhancing investment – to tighten fiscal policy and
leave interest rates at low levels. 
There are two main arguments against the recom-
mended policy mix. The first is the risk that a failure
to raise interest rates enough could add to housing
price increases that will prove destabilising: the argu-
ment is that the adjustments accompanying a subse-
quent fall could cause or amplify an economic down-
turn. Although we do not find strong reasons to
believe in housing price bubbles in Europe (see
Chapter 5 of last year’s report), this risk could be an
argument for policies “leaning against the wind” in
housing markets. But in view of the large differences
in housing price developments among euro area coun-
tries, monetary policy is not the most suitable instru-
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9 See in particular Chapter 2 in the 2003 and Chapter 4 in the 2005
report. See also Public Finances in EMU (2005).
10 See, for example, Mélitz (1997, 2000), Wyplosz (1999) and von
Hagen et al. (2000).
11 The US, where both fiscal and monetary policy were rather expan-
sionary in the recent past, appears to be a clear exception.EEAG Report 33
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ment if one wants to influence price developments in
housing markets. Instead, selective fiscal policy mea-
sures at the national level, such as variations in stamp
duties, would seem preferable.12
Another argument against holding back interest rate
increases is that current interest rates are so low that
there is not much room for lowering them further in
the event of a recession (the liquidity trap argu-
ment). However, this is rather an argument about
what should be the appropriate inflation target, as
this in turn has implications for the so-called neutral
nominal interest rate (the nominal interest rate the
central bank should choose when inflation coincides
with its target and output is at the potential level).
This will be discussed in the concluding section of
this chapter.
Co-ordination failures and the Stability Pact 
A suboptimal mix of monetary and fiscal policies in
the euro area does not come as a surprise. The likeli-
hood of such a co-ordination failure has been point-
ed out ex ante in a large research literature. First, this
literature has identified a number of reasons for a
deficit bias of fiscal policy at the national level.13
These include myopic behaviour by governments
and voters, lobbying of interest groups for specific
expenditure increases (common-pool problems), a
desire by political parties to favour their own con-
stituencies while in power (strategic considerations),
and attempts to raise output above its equilibrium
level through aggregate demand increases (time-
inconsistency problems). Such a deficit bias of fiscal
policy is bound to trigger a contractive monetary
policy on the part of a central bank aiming for low
inflation. 
The literature has emphasised that the deficit bias at
the national level may be exacerbated in a monetary
union. The argument is that governments will then no
longer take full account of the adverse effects of
deficit increases, as they can partly be shifted on to
other member countries.14 Notably, the interest rate
responses will be attenuated, since the ECB targets
euro area inflation, and the fiscal policy of each euro
country will have only a small effect on that. Hence,
anticipated monetary policy responses constrain fis-
cal policy by much less if a country is a member of
EMU than if it is not. The result may be a “bad equi-
librium” for the euro area as a whole with too expan-
sionary fiscal policy and too contractive monetary
policy. This reflects a collective action problem.
Governments do not cut deficits because they are not
convinced that the ECB will reward such action
through looser monetary policy. And the ECB does
not loosen monetary policy, because it is not con-
vinced that this will induce governments to cut
deficits. 
The original establishment of the fiscal rules in the
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact can be seen
as a way of overcoming both the deficit bias at the
national level and the risk that it will be aggravated by
the interaction between decentralised fiscal policy and
centralised monetary policy in the EMU. The numer-
ical constraints on government deficits and debts
worked, in the sense of helping to achieve fiscal con-
solidation, in the run-up to the EMU in the 1990s,
when the prospect of EMU entry represented a large
and highly visible “monetary policy reward” for fiscal
discipline. Once the EMU started, the constraints
gradually lost their bite because of political unwill-
ingness to enforce the rules through the use of the
sanction mechanisms in the fiscal policy framework.
Under the original Stability Pact, there was in fact
only one case, the Netherlands in 2003, where the stip-
ulated excessive deficit procedure to deal with coun-
tries breaching the deficit ceiling of 3 percent of GDP
was clearly followed as envisaged. In other cases –
France and Germany being the most conspicuous ones
– this did not happen.15 The de facto collapse of the
Stability Pact was confirmed de jure by the formal
revisions agreed by EU finance ministers in March
2005. The most important changes are summarised in
Box 1.4.
It has been argued that the breakdown of the Stability
Pact is logical.16 The discretionary, political decision-
making in the excessive deficit procedure can poten-
tially handle the problem of fiscal policy spillovers
among the EMU countries, but it does not address the
national deficit bias problem. Hence, there are strong
incentives for EU finance ministers, subject to such a
bias, to collude in the Ecofin Council when making
decisions on individual countries. Indeed, this was
exactly what happened in 2003 when the Council
decided to put the excessive deficit procedures against
12 See HM Treasury (2003) for a discussion of this option.
13 See, for example, Calmfors (2005) for an overview. 
14 See, for example, Allsopp and Vines (1998), Beetsma and Uhlig
(1999), Dixit and Lambertini (2001), Gatti and van Wijnbergen
(2002), Allsopp and Artis (2003), and Chari and Kehoe (2004).
15 In the case of Portugal, the excessive deficit procedure opened in
2002 was closed in 2004, despite that government debt was above 60
percent of GDP and increasing. The cases of Germany, France and
Greece are discussed in the text. 
16 See in particular Bonatti and Cristini (2005).EEAG Report 34
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Box 1.4 
The reform of the Stability Pact
The so-called Stability Pact (formally the Stability and Growth Pact), originally established in 1997, defines the operational
contents of the fiscal rules in the EU Treaty. The pact consists of a preventive arm, designed to prevent large deficits from
occurring in the first place, and a corrective arm, designed to deal with large deficits once they have arisen. EU ministers of
finance (the Ecofin Council) agreed on a reform of the Stability Pact in March 2005 (Ecofin Report 7423/05). The changes were
incorporated into two new Ecofin Council Regulations (1055/2005 and 1056/2005) in June 2005.
The most important changes concern the so-called excessive deficit procedure in the corrective arm, that is the procedure that
should start when a country has a budget deficit above three percent of GDP and/or a government debt-to-GDP ratio that is above
60 percent and not falling “at a satisfactory pace”.
a)
One set of changes concerns the exemption clauses, that is the provisions defining when a deficit exceeding three percent of GDP
is permitted. In general, a deficit above the three-per-cent limit is not considered “excessive” if it results from “a severe economic
downturn”. According to the original Stability Pact, an annual GDP fall of more than two percent was automatically regarded as
such a downturn and a fall of more than 0.75 percent could be (after a discretionary decision by the Ecofin Council). After the
reform, it is enough with negative growth for the cyclical downturn exemption to apply. It will also apply if a large negative
output gap develops cumulatively over several years, without any need for negative growth in a single year.
According to the original Stability Pact, “all other relevant factors” should also be taken into account in the evaluation of whether
a deficit is excessive. The revised Stability Pact emphasises the importance of this stipulation by enumerating a number of such 
factors. They include “potential growth, prevailing cyclical conditions, the implementation of policies in the context of the Lisbon 
agenda and policies to foster R&D and innovation” as well as “fiscal consolidation efforts in ‘good times’, debt sustainability, 
public investment and the overall quality of public finances”. In addition, the revised pact stipulates that consideration should be
given to “any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned are relevant”. These factors are exemplified with
“budgetary efforts towards increasing or maintaining at a high level financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and 
to achieving European policy goals, notably the unification of Europe”.
The widened cyclical downturn exemption is reasonably well-defined, but the formulations on “other relevant factors” are so
vague and encompassing that they open up for lax interpretations. This is, however, to some extent constrained by a stipulation
that “the other relevant factors” shall be taken into account only if the deficit remains “close” to the three-per-cent ceiling and the
excess over it is “temporary”.
The most radical changes refer to the deadlines for correcting deficits that have been classified as excessive by the Ecofin
Council. According to the original pact, an excessive deficit in year t, which will normally be identified in year t+1, should – 
unless there are special circumstances” – be corrected in year t+2. The revised Stability Pact allows for extended deadlines. First,
the possibilities to set the initial deadline one year later (in year t+3) are increased. This is done through the provision that the
existence of “special circumstances” will be judged after a “balanced overall assessment” of the same “other relevant factors” that
can justify why a deficit above three percent of GDP should not be classified as excessive in the first place. In addition, an
extended initial deadline can be set if an excessive deficit is so large that it cannot be eliminated through an improvement in the
cyclically adjusted fiscal balance of 0.5 percent of GDP (net of one-off and temporary measures).
Second, the revised Stability Pact allows for later-stage extensions of the deadlines and for repetitions of both a recommendation
and a notice (which represents a later and stronger request) from the Ecofin Council to a country to correct an excessive deficit. 
Such later-stage extensions are to be based on considerations regarding the same “other relevant factors” as discussed above. A
condition that needs to be fulfilled is that “unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for
government finances” have occurred during the course of the excessive deficit procedure. The possible extension is one year, both
in the case of a repeated recommendation and in the case of a repeated notice.
In sum, the new possibilities of extending deadlines imply that an excessive deficit that arises in year t  may not have to be
corrected until in year t+5 instead of in year t+2 as was the understanding in the original Stability Pact. This represents a
fundamental weakening of the rules, as it also postpones the imposition of sanctions if excessive deficits persist. A country with
continued excessive deficits may now not have to pay a deposit until in year t+6 and such a deposit cannot be converted into a
fine until in year t+8.  
A number of other changes have also been made. The agreement of the finance ministers calls for an increased emphasis on the
debt criterion in the pact (the requirement that a debt ratio above 60 percent of GDP should be “sufficiently diminishing”). The 
agreement also states the need for “enhanced budgetary discipline in economic good times”. The Commission is now obliged al-
ways to write a report if a country exceeds the three-per-cent-of-GDP deficit limit (which it needed not do earlier if it considered
an exemption clause to apply). The medium-term fiscal objectives according to the preventive arm of the pact (earlier specified as
cyclically adjusted budget outcomes of “close to balance or in surplus”) will in the future be differentiated among countries
(mainly on the basis of differences in potential growth rates and government debt levels) “within a defined range between
– 1 percent of GDP and balance or surplus in cyclically adjusted terms”. Countries that have not reached their medium-term ob-
jectives are to achieve “a minimum annual adjustment” of 0.5 percent of GDP as a benchmark. In case a country deviates signify-
cantly from its medium-term objective and risks running an excessive deficit, the Commission is expected to give policy advice as
a substitute for the previously stipulated early warnings from the Ecofin Council (which have proved difficult to agree on). 
The reform of the Stability Pact has been argued to represent a balanced compromise (see, for example, Public Finances in EMU
2005 or Buti and Franco 2005), where changes working in the direction of weakening fiscal discipline (those referring to
exemption clauses and deadlines) are counterbalanced by other changes helping to strengthen fiscal discipline (those summarised
in the preceding section). We do not share this interpretation, since the latter changes all concern the “soft parts” of the pact,
where stipulations are not backed by sanction possibilities. The crucial changes are the new possibilities of extending deadlines in
the excessive deficit procedure and the associated postponement of sanctions.
The reform of the Stability Pact widens the scope of discretionary, political decision-making in the excessive deficit procedure.
The original justification for the EU fiscal rules was to counteract the deficit bias arising from discretionary fiscal policy making
at the national level. This constraining force was radically weakened already under the old Stability Pact as decision-making in the
excessive deficit procedure gradually became more discretionary. The reform of the Stability Pact does not address this problem.
Instead it aggravates it.
It has been argued that more “flexible” fiscal rules would increase their legitimacy and thus facilitate enforcement (see, for
example, Buti and Franco 2005). This argument would have carried some weight if the revision of the rules had taken the form of
only a few well-defined amendments, introducing transparent contingency clauses. But the argument does not hold when other
policy objectives are to be taken into account in a discretionary and loosely defined way. Strict ex post sanctions against violationsEEAG Report 35
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France and  Germany on hold.17 The reform of the
Stability Pact can be interpreted as an extension of
such collusion from the level of decisions on individ-
ual countries to the level of decisions on institutional
design. 
As can be seen from Table 1.2, there are at present five
euro area countries with deficits above 3 percent of
GDP. The countries are France and Germany (since
2002),  Greece (since 1997, although the excessive
deficits were identified first in 2004), Italy (since 2003,
although the excessive deficits were identified first in
2005) and Portugal (since 2005). According to the
original Stability Pact, Greece in February 2005 was
given an extended deadline until 2006 to correct its
excessive deficit (two years after the identification)
despite a debt-to-GDP ratio of around 110 percent
and despite earlier statistical misreporting that had
allowed the breaches of the deficit ceiling to go unno-
ticed for as long as seven years. After the reform of
the Stability Pact, Italy and Portugal have both been
given extended deadlines of one year (until 2007 for
Italy and until 2008 for Portugal) to eliminate their
excessive deficits. 
The three cases of Greece, Italy and Portugal all set
lax precedents for the future: considerations regard-
ing the cyclical situation and the short-term pains
associated with large fiscal efforts have been given
much larger weight than considerations regarding
debt developments and long-term fiscal sustainabili-
ty. However, the decisions on France and Germany
will be even more important for the future possibili-
ties of enforcing the EU fiscal rules. The formal sit-
uation of these two countries has been unclear after
the legal dispute regarding the Ecofin Council deci-
sion in late 2003 to put the excessive deficit proce-
dures against them on hold. But there appears now
to be an understanding that the two countries will be
phased into the new fiscal framework in such a way
that they get until 2007 to reduce their deficits below
3 percent of GDP. This implies a total extension of
the original deadlines (which were set at 2004) by
three years. As is clear from Box 1.4, this is stretch-
ing the revised rules to a maximum, and probably
even beyond that, as such a long extension should
require the occurrence of new “unexpected adverse
events”. This will establish a very lax precedent for
the future. The consequence will be that the credibil-
ity also of the revised Stability Pact is undermined
from the very start.
Are there future hopes for a better policy mix?
The watering-down of the Stability Pact leads to pes-
simistic conclusions on future fiscal discipline and the
possibilities to achieve a better balance between fiscal
and monetary policy in the euro area. The loosening
of the pact is now a political fact. It is unlikely to lead
to any dramatic consequences in the near future.
Weaker incentives for fiscal discipline are instead
more likely to produce a “creeping crisis” where gov-
ernment debt levels in some countries may gradually
be edging up. The political preconditions for strength-
ening fiscal discipline again will not emerge until gov-
ernment indebtedness is again widely regarded as a
major economic-policy problem. 
Still, it could be worth reflecting on various ways of
trying to re-establish stronger incentives for fiscal dis-
cipline and a more appropriate macroeconomic poli-
cy mix. We see basically three kinds of initiatives that
could help launch such a process at some point in the
future.
A first possibility is a strengthening of national fiscal
policy institutions. This could involve a clearer defin-
ition of fiscal policy objectives and clearer guidelines
for how fiscal policy should be used to stabilise the
business cycle as well as the establishment of national
fiscal policy councils with the task of monitoring that
government policies are consistent with pre-set objec-
tives. Earlier EEAG reports have discussed such pro-
of rules that are not clearly defined are not likely to command legitimacy. Also, the more discretionary decisions leading to
sanctions are, the larger the risk that the state being exposed to them will regard them as “hostile actions” by other member states.
This, too, serves to decrease the probability that sanctions will ever be imposed. 
The most worrying aspect of the reform of the Stability Pact is not the actual changes that have been implemented. It is the
demonstration that the rules are endogenous and likely to change in response to violations of them, at least if the perpetrators are
large countries. Hence, the new looser rules are no more credible than the earlier stricter ones.
a) See Calmfors (2005) for a more complete analysis of the reform of the stability pact.
17 Germany then supported France and vice versa. Both countries
were supported by Portugal (which was also subjected to an excessive
deficit procedure), Italy (which later proved to have exceeded the
three-per-cent deficit ceiling already in 2003) and the UK (also with
a larger deficit than three percent of GDP in 2003/04). In addition,
Luxembourg and Ireland voted in favour of the French and German
positions.posals thoroughly.18 They would not address the co-
ordination problems associated with fiscal policy
spillovers across EMU countries, but they could alle-
viate the deficit bias problem originating at the
national level, which has been the root cause of the
difficulties of enforcing the Stability Pact.
A second possibility, proposed by Calmfors (2005), is
that a smaller group of EU countries could enter into
enhanced fiscal policy co-operation by undertaking to
uphold more stringent provisions than in the watered-
down Stability Pact and thereby setting an example of
fiscal rectitude for the EU as a whole. The proposal
seeks to exploit the fact that different countries may
have different interest in supranational rules: in gen-
eral one would expect smaller countries – that would
otherwise have problems asserting their interests – to
be more interested in credible rules at the EU level
than the larger countries.19 Possible candidates for
participation could be countries like Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain
and Sweden; these countries have exerted more fiscal
discipline than the larger countries. 
Such enhanced fiscal policy co-operation might con-
tain both procedural and policy commitments. The
procedural commitments could aim at remedying the
current “disconnect”between policy considerations at
the EU and the national level. Participating countries
could commit to letting the Commission present its
evaluations of national fiscal policy (both within the
fiscal surveillance process and the excessive deficit
procedure) before the national parliaments and to
holding parliamentary hearings and debates on the
basis of them. As concerns actual policies, the partic-
ipating countries could commit to correcting excessive
deficits promptly, and thus not using the possibilities
of extended deadlines in the revised Stability Pact,
except in extreme situations.20
A third possibility would take the problem of co-
ordinating fiscal and monetary policies at its starting
point. It is a common view – which we share – that
attempts at repeated co-ordination of actual policy
decisions (exchanging looser monetary policy for
tighter fiscal policy) are dangerous, because they
might subject the ECB to undue political pressures
and thus compromise its independence.21 But there
may be a stronger case for co-ordination of one-shot
institutional reforms. There are good arguments for
why the ECB should have a higher (and symmetric)
inflation target than today, say 2.5 or 3 percent. This
would reduce the risk of deflation and of being
caught in a liquidity trap in a recession (because the
neutral nominal interest rate would be raised). The
aggregate real wage level would fall to the extent that
it is now being raised because desired real wage
reductions in some parts of the economy are pre-
vented by downward nominal wage rigidity.22 This
would contribute to higher equilibrium employment.
And real exchange rate adjustments within the euro
area would be facilitated to the extent that they are
now held back by downward nominal wage rigidity
in countries – like Greece, Italy and Portugal – that
need to improve their competitiveness. In the current
situation after the loosening of the Stability Pact, a
reformulation of the ECB’s inflation objective is not
possible, because it would involve serious credibility
risk. A re-establishment of fiscal discipline would,
however, create conditions under which this could be
possible. It might be a good idea for the ECB to
openly link the prospect of monetary policy reform
to such a restoration of a more stringent fiscal
framework, thus offering governments the prospect
of a “monetary policy reward” in response to a
strengthening of incentives for fiscal discipline.23
Such fiscal policy reforms could entail a rolling back
of the possibilities of extending deadlines in the
excessive deficit procedure and measures to increase
the credibility of the enforcement process as well as
the establishment of stronger fiscal policy institu-
tions at the national level. 
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Table A1
Real gross domestic product, consumer prices and unemployment rates in European countries. 








world GDP 2004  2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 
Germany  21.4  1.6 0.9 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.7 9.5 9.4 9.2 
France  15..9 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.1 1.9 9.6 9.5 9.2 
Italy  13..0 1.2 0.2 1.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 8.0 7.8 7.5 
Spain  8.1  3.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.1  11.0 9.2 8.7 
Netherlands 4.7  1.7 0.7 2.2 1.4 1.6 1.3 4.6 4.7 4.5 
Belgium 2.7  2.6 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.1 7.9 8.4 8.1 
Austria  2.3  2.4 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 4.8 5.2 4.9 
Greece  1.6  4.7 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.1  10.5 10.0 9.6 
Finland  1.4  3.6 1.5 3.2 0.1 0.8 1.3 8.8 8.3 7.9 
Ireland  1.4  4.5 4.6 4.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 4.5 4.3 4.0 
Portugal 1.4  1.2 0.9 1.5 2.5 2.0 2.1 6.7 7.3 7.1 
Luxembourg 0.2  4.5 3.7 3.9 3.2 3.6 3.1 4.8 5.3 5.1 
Euro area
c) 74.3  2.1 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.9 8.8 8.5 8.2 
United  Kingdom 16.6  3.2 1.7 2.4 1.3 2.0 1.9 4.7 4.6 4.4 
Sweden  2.7  3.7 2.5 2.6 1.0 0.8 1.5 6.3 6.3 6.0 
Denmark  1.9  2.1 2.4 2.2 0.9 1.4 1.7 5.4 5.0 4.9 
EU-15
c) 95.4  2.3 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.9 8.0 7.8 7.5 
Poland  1.9  5.3 3.3 3.9 3.6 2.2 2.3  18.8 17.9 17.5
Czech  Republic 0.8  4.4 4.6 4.4 2.6 1.6 2.1 8.3 8.0 7.8 
Hungary 0.8  4.6 4.2 4.3 6.8 3.5 3.2 6.0 7.1 6.7 
Slovakia  0.3  5.5 5.3 5.6 7.5 2.6 2.9  18.2 16.5 16.0
Slovenia  0.3  4.2 4.0 4.0 3.6 2.4 2.3 6.0 5.8 5.6 
Lithuania  0.2  7.0 6.5 6.5 1.1 2.5 2.3  10.9 8.2 8.1 
Cyprus 0.1  3.8 3.5 4.0 1.9 1.7 2.1 5.2 6.1 5.5 
Latvia 0.1  8.3 8.5 8.0 6.2 6.4 6.1 9.8 9.1 8.5 
Estonia  0.1  7.8 8.0 7.0 3.0 3.9 3.2 9.2 7.6 7.8 
Malta 0.0  0.4 1.5 1.8 2.7 2.7 2.5 7.6 8.0 7.7 
EU-10  4.6  5.1 4.2 4.4 4.1 2.5 2.6  14.2 13.5 13.1
EU-25
c) 100.0  2.4 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 9.0 8.7 8.4 
a) Western Europe (except for Switzerland): harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
b)Standardised. – 
c) Sum of the listed
countries. Gross domestic product and consumer prices weighted with the gross domestic product of 2004 in US dollars;
unemployment rate weighted with the number of employees in 2003.
Sources: EUROSTAT; OECD; IMF; 2004 and 2005: calculations by the Ifo institute. 
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Table A2
Real gross domestic product, consumer prices and unemployment rates
Gross domestic product Consumer prices





world GDP 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 
EU-25  35.1  2.4 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.0 9.0 8.7 8.4 
Switzerland  1.0  2.1 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.2 0.8 4.4 4.2 4.0 
Norway  0.7  2.9 2.8 2.8 0.4 1.9 2.1 4.4 4.3 4.1 
Western and Central
Europe  36.8  2.4 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 8.8 8.5 8.2 
USA 32.0  4.2 3.5 3.4 2.7 3.2 3.0 5.5 5.1 4.9 
Japan  12.8  2.3 2.3 2.4 0.0  –  0.3 0.2 4.7 4.4 4.1 
Canada  2.7  2.9 3.0 3.1 1.8 2.3 2.3 7.2 6.8 6.6 
Industrialised countries
total  84.5  3.1 2.5 2.7 1.9 2.1 2.1 6.9 6.5 6.3 
Newly industrialised  
countries
Russia  1.6  7.2 5.7 5.4  11.0 13.0  12.0 8.3 8.0 8.0 
East Asia
a) 4.7  5.5  4.0  4.5 . . . . . .
China  4.5  9.5  9.2  8.5 . . . . . .
Latin America
b) 4.9  5.9  4.0  3.6 . . . . . .
Newly industrialised  
countries total 15.5  7.0  5.7  5.5 . . . . . .
Total
c) 100.0 3.7 3.0 3.1 . . . . . . 
World trade, volume 8.0 6.5 7.0 . . . . . . 
a) Weighted average of: Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines. Weighted with the gross
domestic product of 2004 in US dollars. – 
b) Weighted average of: Brasil, Mexico, Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela, Chile,
Peru. Weighted with the gross domestic product of 2004 in US dollars. – 
c) Sum of the listed groups of countries. Weighted
with the gross domestic product of 2004 in US dollars.
Sources: EU; OECD; IMF; National Statistical Offices; 2005 and 2006: calculations by the Ifo Institute. 
Table A3
Key forecast figures for the euro area 
 2004  2005  2006 
Percentage change over previous year
Real gross domestic product 2.1  1.4  2.0 
Private consumption  1.5  1.3  1.4 
Government consumption  1.2  1.2  1.2 
Gross fixed capital formation  2.2  2.0  3.0 
Net exports
a) 0.1  –  0.1  0.2 
Consumer prices
b) 2.1  2.2  1.9 
Percentage of nominal gross domestic product
Government financial balance
c) – 2.7  – 2.9  – 2.8 
 Percentage  of employees
Unemployment rate
d) 8.8  8.5  8.2 
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous
year). –
b) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
c)2005 and 2006: forecast
of the European Commission. – 
 d) Standardised.
Source: Eurostat; 2005 and 2006: forecasts by the Ifo institute. Appendix 2:
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)24
In October 2005 the World Economic Climate
slightly improved, after a year of economic cooling.
The climate indicator stands at 99.3 (after 97.5 in
July: 1995 = 100), considerably above its long-term
average (1990–2004: 94.0). The improvement of the
overall climate index was due to better assessments
of the current economic situation. According to the
expectations for the coming six months, the global
economy is foreseen to stabilise in the first half of
2006 at the current favourable level. In the follow-
ing, we summarise the results of the latest survey.
The two components of the climate indicator, the
assessment of the current situation and the expecta-
tions for the next six months are depicted in the dia-
grams below.
World economy: stabilisation at a favourable level
The latest survey results have confirmed the July sur-
vey expectations that the global economic slow-down
that set in at the beginning of 2004 will level off by the
end of 2005. The current economic situation in
October was judged somewhat better than in July and
again above “satisfactory”. The economic expecta-
tions for the first half of 2006 point to further eco-
nomic stabilisation. However, the interpretation of
the recent results must take into consideration that
the underlying economic trends strongly differ
between the regions. The economic climate declined
somewhat in October in the United States. However,
in other parts of the world, primarily in Western
Europe and Japan, the economic climate improved,
pointing to a solid economic stabilisation in the first
half of 2006. Global GDP is expected to continue to
grow robustly: We project global growth of about
41/2 percent for 2005 and the same for 2006. But high
oil prices remain a burden on the global economy.
Particularly during the winter months in the Northern
hemisphere, the recent surge in energy prices, exacer-
bated by the shutdown of oil platforms and refineries
due to the hurricanes in the United States, is seen as a
constraint to a stronger global economic expansion. 
Western Europe: the economy remains on recovery
course
According to the recent survey results, both the
assessments of the current economic situation and the
economic expectations for the next six months point
to an improvement of the economic climate in
Western Europe.
Although the economic climate improved, on aver-
age, in the euro area in October, the vast majority of
WES experts surveyed in this region still judged the
present economic situation of their countries to be
below a “satisfactory” level. In particular, in Por-
tugal, Italy, Germany and France the assessments of
the present economic situation – despite a reported
improvement – remained in the negative territory,
indicating that the economic recovery is still hesi-
tant. However, in all these countries the outlook for
the first half of 2006 is very optimistic. In other
countries of the euro area – Belgium, Austria, Spain
and Greece – assessments of the present economic
performance were more or less at a satisfactory level.
A particularly favourable economic climate was
again reported for Ireland and  Finland. Though,
according to the official figures, unemployment is
declining in most Western European countries, for
example in France and Germany, adding to signs that
economic growth is gathering pace, it is still consid-
ered to be the most important economic problem at
present. Another important economic problem in
the  euro area remains insufficient demand. It was
considered particularly problematic in Austria,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
In the countries outside the euro area, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden and  Switzerland, the present eco-
nomic situation was assessed considerably above “sat-
isfactory”. The panel’s forecast for the coming six
months reflects a stabilisation of the current positive
state. In contrast, in the United Kingdom the overall
climate index deteriorated strongly in the course of
2005. According to the latest results, business senti-
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24 The World Economic Survey (WES) assesses worldwide economic
trends by polling transnational as well as national organizations
worldwide on current economic developments in their respective
countries. This allows for a rapid, up-to-date assessment of the eco-
nomic situation prevailing around the world. In October 2005, 1,100
economic experts in 91 countries were polled. WES is conducted in
co-operation with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in
Paris and receives financial support from the European Commission.
The survey questionnaire focuses on qualitative information: assess-
ments of a country’s general economic situation and expectations
regarding important economic indicators. It has proved to be a use-
ful tool, since it reveals economic changes earlier than conventional
business statistics. The individual replies are combined for each
country without weighting. The grading procedure consists in giving
a grade of 9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent replies
(=) and a grade of 1 to negative (–) replies. Overall grades within the
range of 5 to 9 indicate that positive answers prevail or that a major-
ity expects trends to strengthen, whereas grades within the range of
1 to 5 reveal predominantly negative replies or expectations of weak-
ening trends. The survey results are published as aggregated data.
The aggregation procedure is based on country classifications.
Within each country group or region, the country results are weight-
ed according to the share of the specific country’s exports and
imports in total world trade.EEAG Report 41
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ments brightened somewhat in October. However, the
survey economists expect a slowdown in consumer
spending and corporate investment to remain sluggish
into 2006.
North America: the economic climate deteriorates
According to the latest survey results, the economic
climate indicator in North America deteriorated in
October. Both components – assessment of the cur-
rent economic situation as well as economic expecta-
tions – have been downgraded. Undoubtedly, the
socio-economic damages caused by the autumn hurri-
canes have depressed business confidence in the
United States. However, the current economic situa-
tion is still regarded as above “satisfactory” by the
majority of WES experts in the US. Both capital ex-
penditures and consumer spending kept momentum,
and the outlook for the coming half year is solid.
Among the most important economic problems the
surveyed economists again named the public deficits
and lack of confidence in the government’s economic
policy.
In  Canada, the economic climate remained favour-
able. The current economic situation has again been
rated above the “satisfactory” level. Economic expec-
tations, though slightly downgraded here as well,
point to economic stabilisation in the first months of
2006. Lack of international competitiveness was seen
by surveyed experts to be the most important problem
in the Canadian economy.
Eastern Europe: economic stabilisation
The overall economic climate stabilised in October at
a “satisfactory”level, with the assessments of the cur-
rent economic situation continuing to improve and
economic expectations for the coming six months
pointing to further economic stabilisation. WES
experts surveyed in the region forecast a marked
increase in the foreign trade sector (with rising exports
and imports) for the coming six months. 
The present economic situation in the eight Eastern
European countries that joined the European Union –
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Estonia, Lithuania and  Latvia – has been assessed
considerably above the “satisfactory” level, according
to economic experts polled by WES in the region.
Only in Hungary have the marks for the current eco-
nomic performance again slipped below this level. In
Latvia and Slovakia, the economic climate index also
declined somewhat, but remained in positive territory.
The near-term prospects remained generally positive
in all new EU members except Slovenia. However, the
high unemployment that is substantially above the
levels prevailing in the Western countries of the
European Union poses the number one economic
problem in the Eastern European transition econo-
mies, according to WES experts.
In the other Eastern European countries outside the
EU, diverging economic trends predominate. In
Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, the present economic
situation was assessed as “satisfactory” with pros-
pects for future development remaining highly posi-
tive. In contrast, in Croatia and in Serbia and Monte-
negro the present economic situation was seen as
below the “satisfactory” level. But WES experts are
confident of an improvement in the near term. Not so
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where no turnaround of the
presently unfavourable economic situation is expected
in the next six months.
CIS: the economic climate is satisfactory
The economic stabilisation in Russia continues,
according to the recent WES results. After a slight
deterioration of business confidence during 2004, the
economic climate indicator in Russia stabilised in
2005, with both the assessment of the current eco-
nomic situation and economic expectations being in
the positive zone. However, as the world’s second
largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia, Russia’s eco-
nomic performance is closely tied to rather volatile oil
prices. Whereas the oil sector is currently booming,
the majority of the other economic sectors is having
difficulty competing with products and services from
abroad. Thus, as a present economic weak point,
WES experts named again “lack of international
competitiveness”. Also “lack of confidence in govern-
ment’s economic policy” was cited as an important
problem. The latter also holds true in Ukraine, where
the economic climate deteriorated somewhat and also
the economic outlook became somewhat clouded. A
highly favourable economic climate has been reported
again for Kazakhstan. With regard to the future eco-
nomic development, the participants are fairly confi-
dent. High inflation has been named as one of the
most important present constraints to economic
growth in the country though the inflation rate in
Kazakhstan is significantly lower than in Russia. Asia: optimistic forecasts
According to the October survey results, the econom-
ic climate in Asia improved slightly, compared to the
preceding July survey. For the first time since the end
of 2004 the assessments of the present economic situ-
ation have been upgraded. The economic expecta-
tions for the first half of 2005 point to further stabil-
isation. However, this pattern does not apply to all
countries surveyed in the region.
Japan’s economy in particular seems to have
strengthened in the second half of 2005: both com-
ponents of the economic climate indicator bounced
back strongly after this year’s spring lull. The present
economic situation is now rated as above “satisfacto-
ry” and the prospects for the coming year are highly
optimistic. An improved economic situation has been
reported by WES experts in Hong Kong, though the
overall climate index slightly slipped due to some-
what less optimistic near-term expectations. China’s
very high economic growth rates are expected to
moderate in the near future. However, the business
sentiments in the country remained favourable
according to the October results. Among common
economic problems, unemployment remained the
main challenge in the country despite its strong eco-
nomic dynamics. The economy in India maintained
its expansion course also in October, according to
economists surveyed in the country. Though both
components of the economic climate index have been
slightly downgraded, the marks for the present eco-
nomic situation were the highest in the region, and
also the expectations for 2006 point to further eco-
nomic expansion. However, despite real GDP growth
rates at about seven percent per annum, the growth in
agriculture remains weak; India’s farm sector
accounts for nearly a quarter of India’s gross domes-
tic product and employs about two-thirds of the
workforce in the country. 
In South Korea business confidence is now at a two-
year high, raising hopes that a broad-based recovery
is under way in Asia’s third-largest economy. Private
consumption is still regarded as weak, but exports
are expected to strengthen further in the coming
months. In Singapore, the Philippines and Pakistan
improved assessments of the present economic per-
formance were contrasted with cautious expecta-
tions regarding the near-term economic develop-
ment. Both components of the economic climate
index improved in Thailand and Vietnam. The cur-
rent economic situation is rated as satisfactory and
the economic expectations point to stabilisation in
the course of the next six months. An unchanged
favourable economic climate was also reported for
Malaysia. In Indonesia the economic climate index
slightly deteriorated due to less positive expecta-
tions, but remained in a “satisfactory” zone. In the
Asian region only in Taiwan did the surveyed experts
assess the overall economic situation as below the
“satisfactory” level and the near-term expectations
remained cautious.
Oceania: economic rebound in Australia
In 2005 the panel’s responses for Australia and New
Zealand reflected an economic slow-down, starting
from a relatively high level: In the July survey the
economic climate index slipped marginally.
However, the economic patterns of the two coun-
tries of the region seem to show diverging economic
trends. While the assessments of the current eco-
nomic situation improved considerably in Australia,
the present economic performance continued to
deteriorate in New Zealand, according to the polled
economists. Also the business outlook in Australia
for the first half of 2006 brightened. In particular
the export sector is expected to regain new strength.
For a net gas and coal exporter such as Australia,
increased export earnings from gas and coal exports
partially offset the negative impact of higher oil
prices. In contrast, in New Zealand the polled ex-
perts remained cautious: according to the panel’s
forecast, the economic cooling phase will last into
the first half of 2006. 
Latin America: stabilising markets
The latest survey results confirm economic stabilisa-
tion in Latin America. Both, the current economic sit-
uation and economic expectations have been upgrad-
ed, though to a slightly lesser degree than in other
WES regions. 
Increasing business confidence was reported by
experts in Brazil. The assessments of the present
economic situation are above satisfactory, and the
prospects for the next six months point to further
economic growth. The government’s economic poli-
cy seems to enjoy public confidence in the country.
A bright picture of the economic climate has again
been drawn by experts in Chile. The economic per-
formance in the country is remarkably strong, since
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all demand aggregates are performing satisfactorily
and are expected to stabilise further in the first half
of 2006. The October survey results confirmed that
Peru’s economy is one of the most vibrant in Latin
America. Economic growth is fuelled by strong cap-
ital expenditures and private consumption and a
buoyant foreign trade sector. Uruguay also counts
among the group of buoyant economies. The pre-
sent economic performance is seen to be above “sat-
isfactory” and is expected to remain on the upward
trend. 
The economic climate in Argentina stabilised at a
“satisfactory” level. Although both the current eco-
nomic situation as well as the near-term expectations
have been slightly downgraded, the corporate expen-
ditures are still regarded as weak. However, some
strengthening is foreseen by the surveyed economists
for the foreign trade sector as well as for private con-
sumption. The present economic situation in Mexico
also stabilised at a favourable level in the course of
2005, according to the experts polled in the country,
but the expectations for 2006 remained cautious. 
Although there were no further improvements of the
economic climate in El Salvador and  Colombia in
October, experts questioned in the survey basically
confirmed the favourable results of the preceding
July survey. In Costa Rica the surveyed experts
assessed the present economic situation as somewhat
below “satisfactory”. Also the outlook for the com-
ing six months suggests a rather sluggish economic
development. In contrast, Venezuela’s economy has a
tailwind from record high oil prices and the panel’s
responses suggest that a recovery from the deep reces-
sion caused by the oil strike of 2002–2003 is gaining
strength. The assessments of the present economic
situation have now reached a “satisfactory”level and
the forecast of the panel points to further economic
rebound. Also the economic climate in Bolivia
remains stable, despite a tense political situation in
the country. The assessments of the country’s present
economic situation have been maintained at the “sat-
isfactory” levels and the expectations for 2006
remained positive.
Among all countries of the region, only in Ecuador
and Paraguay did the present economic performance
still receive negative marks from the surveyed experts.
However, in Paraguay, both assessments of the pre-
sent economic situation as well as economic expecta-
tions for the comings six months have been upgraded,
promising more dynamic development in 2006. 
Near East: the economic climate remains
favourable
According to WES experts the economic climate in
the Near East remained favourable. Though the
assessments of the present economic situation deteri-
orated slightly since this year’s July poll, the outlook
for the coming six months improved somewhat.
The current economic situation continues to be good
particularly in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and in the United
Arab Emirates. Also the expectations for the next six
months stayed bright in these countries. 
The assessments of the present economic situation
in  Turkey remained above the “satisfactory” level,
according to the October results. The prospects for
future development promise further economic
strengthening in the coming six months. Overall, the
last two years’ WES survey results suggest that
Turkey has entered an era of economic stability. In
Israel the assessment of the present situation im-
proved considerably. The majority of WES experts
polled in Israel assessed the current economic situa-
tion as “good”. Also the outlook for the next six
months is optimistic – private consumption and cap-
ital expenditures are expected to strengthen and the
export sector is also expected to pick up somewhat,
signalling that economic recovery is underway.
However, terrorist threats and the security situation
in general remain the main constraints to a quicker
economic revival. 
The economic situation in Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon
and also in Iran is now regarded as “satisfactory”.
However, in Iran according to WES experts the eco-
nomic outlook for the coming months appears to be
clouded. In the other countries, WES experts are fair-
ly confident concerning a positive economic develop-
ment in the beginning of 2006. 
Africa: Diverging economic trends predominate
Africa remains a region with very diverging economic
trends. Thus, an aggregated climate index for coun-
tries surveyed by WES on this continent makes little
sense, and the following analysis will focus on partic-
ular economic trends in individual countries.
The economic climate index in South Africa stabilised
during 2005 at a highly favourable level, after a
decade of economic expansion. According to theOctober survey, business sentiment concerning the
current economic situation remained positive, while
the economic expectations have improved further. In
contrast, the economic recovery in Egypt is still rather
sluggish, according to economists surveyed in the
country. The present economic situation is still
assessed as far below “satisfactory”. The economic
expectations, though slightly downgraded, still raise
hope for an economic turn-around in 2006. The worst
economic situation of all 90 countries covered by
WES was again reported from Zimbabwe where the
outlook also remained very bleak. All the surveyed
experts gave the most negative marks that are possible
on the WES-scale for both present economic situation
and expectations. 
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